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I. INTRODUCTION
When a defendant's DNA matches a sample found at a crime scene,
how compelling is the match? To answer this question, DNA analysts
typically use numbers-"relative frequencies," "random match
probabilities" or "likelihood ratios. '  They compute and present these
quantities for the major racial or ethnic groups in the United States,
supplying prosecutors with such mind-boggling figures as "one in nine
hundred and fifty sextillion African Americans, one in one hundred and
thirty septillion Caucasians, and one in nine hundred and thirty sextillion
Hispanics.,
2
A line of California cases rejects this established practice on relevance
grounds.3 The theory of these cases is that only the perpetrator's race is
relevant to the crime; hence, it is impermissible to introduce statistics about
other races. 4 This Article describes these cases-and their recent demise.
Relying on the statistical concept of likelihood, it then presents a logical
justification for referring to a range of races and identifies some problems
with the one-race-only rule.5 The Article concludes by noting some ways to
express the probative value of a DNA match quantitatively without actually
referring to variations in DNA profile frequencies among races.
6
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CALIFORNIA LAW
A. The General Acceptance of Multiplying Allele Frequencies
Geneticists normally apply a theoretical population-genetics model to
derive DNA profile frequencies from empirical estimates of "allele"
1. See DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE: CONTROVERSIES
OVER THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GENETIC EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY (forthcoming); Jonathan J.
Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 373, 375-
76, 388 (2002).
2. People v. Nelson, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 404 n.2 (Ct. App. 2006), rev. granted, 147 P.3d
1011 (Cal. 2006). A septillion is 1024, So 130 septillion is on the order of 1026. The other figures
quoted would have slightly fewer zeroes in them, but they still make Carl Sagan's famous
"billions and billions" seem small. See CARL SAGAN, BILLIONS & BILLIONS: THOUGHTS ON LIFE
AND DEATH AT THE BRINK OF THE MILLENNIUM (1997).
3. See infra Part ll.B.
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. See infra Parts III & IV.
6. See infra Part V.
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frequencies.7 We need not get bogged down in the formulas to appreciate
the key ideas. The simplest imaginable model lumps everybody into a large
population in which all people choose their mates independently of the
DNA variations (the alleles) used in identification testing.8 In effect, the
alleles are randomly shuffled throughout the population, and the expected
proportions of people with the various possible combinations of alleles (the
profiles) are, within various factors of two, the product of the proportions of
all the alleles in the large population.9
Of course, the population is "structured" in the sense that different
racial groups tend to mate preferentially among themselves.' ° This would
not affect the profile frequencies if every racial population had the same
initial proportions of alleles, but samples categorized by self-identified
racial categories show variations in the proportions across races. I'
Geneticists basically assumed that mating was random within each race and
computed expected proportions within each major race according to the
"unmodified product rule"'12 described above. In ordinary "general
population cases,"' 3 in which the perpetrator might conceivably be from any
of the major racial groups, it became conventional to present these profile
frequencies for each major "race"-"Black," "Hispanic," and
"Caucasian."'
14
For a time in the 1980s and 1990s, the accuracy of the within-race
estimates was intensely controversial.15 Some expert witnesses testified that
there were scientific objections to the quality and quantity of the data on
7. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 25 (1996) [hereinafter COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC
SCI.: AN UPDATE]; see also DAVID J. BALDING, WEIGHT-OF-EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC DNA
PROFILES (2005); JOHN S. BUCKLETON ET AL., DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION (2005); IAN W.
EVETr & BRUCE S. WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR
FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (1998).
8. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, supra note 7, at 90.
9. Id. at 90-91.
10. See id. at 99 ("Matings tend to occur between persons who are likely to share some
common ancestry and thus to be somewhat related.").
11. But see id. at 57-58, 94 ("[D]ifferences among individuals within a race are much larger
than the differences between races.").
12. People v. Venegas, 954 P.2d 525, 536, 542 (Cal. 1998).
13. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts, 7
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 137, 148 (1993) (distinguishing between "general population cases" in
which more or less anyone (or anyone within a major racial group) might have committed the
crime and "special population cases" in which "the group of people who might have left the crime
sample are a narrow and possibly insular subpopulation").
14. See, e.g., Venegas, 954 P.2d at 537.
15 See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE
MAKING OF DNA PROFILING (2007); KAYE, supra note 1; see also infra notes 16-20.
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DNA allele frequencies and that the racial populations could well contain
significant substructure themselves.' 6 These difficulties could make the
profile frequency calculated for the racial population smaller (or, more
often, larger)1 7 than its true value. Experts recruited by the prosecution
conceded that the estimated profile frequencies were just estimates, but they
were confident that the unmodified-product-rule computations were
approximately correct.18 Unable or unwilling to take sides in this debate, an
independent panel of scientists and other experts appointed by the National
Academy of Sciences proposed further research and temporary use of the
"modified ceiling principle"19-a "conservative" variation on the
unmodified product rule.2°
California appellate courts were divided over the general acceptance of
these methods for computing profile frequencies within the major races
until relatively recently.2' In 1998, in People v. Venegas,22 the California
Supreme Court determined that the "modified ceiling approach [was]
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community as a forensically
sound approach for calculating statistical probabilities of random matches
of DNA profiles., 23 The next year, in People v. Soto,24 the court concluded
from "the clear weight of judicial authority, and the published scientific
commentary, that the unmodified product rule.., has gained general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community and therefore meets the
[California] standard for admissibility. 25 Yet, the admissibility of these
DNA statistics in California was not assured.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250 (D. Vt. 1990), aff'd, 955 F.2d 786
(2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), affd sub nom. United
States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
17. See Kaye, supra note 13, at 142 (arguing that population structure generally favors the
defendant in a general-population case).
18. See, e.g., Jakobetz, 747 F. Supp. 250; see also Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161.
19. Venegas, 954 P.2d at 538.
20. The committee regarded the ceiling principle as "conservative" in the sense of being
generous to the defendant. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC Sci., NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 76-79 (discussing the "Multiplication Rule"
("Product Rule")), 82-83 (discussing the "Ceiling Pnnciple") (1992).
21. The schism began when People v. Barney, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731 (Ct. App. 1992), diverged
from People v. Axell, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (Ct. App. 1991).
22. 954 P.2d 525.
23. Id. at 552.
24. 981 P.2d 958 (Cal. 1999).
25. Id. at 977.
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B. The Relevance Objection
1. Pizarro
A line of California appellate cases continued to reject DNA statistics
on distinct relevance grounds. The California Court of Appeal for the Fifth
District initiated this misadventure in People v. Pizarro.26 In 1990, Michael
Pizarro was convicted of "murder, forcible lewd or lascivious act on a child
under 14, and forcible rape" for raping and suffocating his thirteen-year-old
half-sister.27 Vaginal swabs from the girl's body revealed semen that
matched Pizarro's DNA type.28 At trial, an FBI analyst testified that "[t]he
likelihood of finding another unrelated Hispanic individual with a similar
profile as Mr. Pizarro is one in approximately 250,000. "29 Pizarro appealed,
contending that the DNA evidence was inadmissible because the
prosecution had failed to demonstrate that the DNA test procedure and the
within-race multiplications were generally accepted in the scientific
community. 30 The court of appeal remanded for a hearing on this issue.
31
After the hearing, the trial court again ruled that the evidence was
32admissible and reentered the judgment. A second appeal and a rehearing
followed.33 In its final opinion in 2003, the court of appeal determined that
it was improper for the prosecution to have offered an estimate of the
frequency of a genotype in the Hispanic population - and no other group
34
- when there was no proof (other than that pointing to Pizarro) that the
perpetrator of the crime was Hispanic.35 For this reason, the court of appeal
again reversed.36
26. 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 21 (Ct. App. 2003), rev. denied (Oct 15, 2003). This case was disapproved
of in People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864 (Cal. 2006). The description here is restricted to a single
issue. Some factual complications also are omitted. For a more complete discussion of the case,
see D. H. Kaye, Logical Relevance: Problems with the Reference Population and DNA Mixtures
in People v. Pizarro, 3 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 211 (2004).
27. 3 Cal.Rptr. 3d at 28-29, 38.
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id. at 97-98 (internal quotation marks omitted). This characterization of the statistic is
ambiguous. See Kaye, supra note 26, at 213 n.20.




34. Actually, the prosecution presented frequency estimates in two population groups -
Hispanic and Caucasian. But these were chosen because the defendant was said to be half
Caucasian and half Hispanic. Id. at 97-98. For brevity, this Article refers only to the Hispanic
database.
35. Id. at 100-05.
36. Pizarro, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 106-07.
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This result is justifiable. As noted above, the frequencies of DNA
alleles vary across self-identified racial or ethnic groups.37 If the perpetrator
could have come from any of several groups, looking to only one such
group for a random-match probability could be misleading. Moreover,
hearing only one statistic, the jury might jump to the conclusion that the
perpetrator must have come from that one racial group.
But the court did not stop here. It announced in dictum that the
standard practice of giving a range of frequencies for all the major racial or
ethnic groups in the United States also would have been unacceptable
because the frequency of the genotype in any given racial group is totally
irrelevant without proof of the perpetrator's race.38 According to the court:
[I]n the absence of sufficient evidence of the perpetrator's ethnicity, any
particular ethnic frequency is irrelevant. The problem is . . . one of
preliminary fact . . . . It does not matter how many Hispanics,
Caucasians, Blacks, or Native Americans resemble the perpetrator if the
perpetrator is actually Asian. If various ethnic frequencies are presented
to the jury, each will have been admitted without adequate foundation.
39
The Pizarro court insisted that the race of the possible perpetrator was one
of those "preliminary facts" that had to rest on "independent proof.,
40
2. Wilson
This relevance argument recurred in People v. Wilson.4 1 "[T]he body of
a 13-year-old white girl was discovered on the living room floor of her
Vacaville home by her mother and sister" in the early evening.42 "She had
been strangled with a telephone cord" and had "bruises, scrapes, and
scratches on her body. 4 3 Wilson, who was African-American, had scrapes
and bruises and blood on his clothing when he was arrested at two a.m. the
next morning.44 DNA matches were found between the victim's DNA and
stains on Wilson's clothing, and between stains on the victim and Wilson.4 5
As the Court of Appeal for the First District described the statistics:
Wilson's genetic profile would be expected to occur in 1 of 96 billion
37. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
38. 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 104.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Id. at 34.
41. 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 102 (Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 136 P.3d 864 (Cal. 2006).
42. Id. at 104.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id.
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Caucasians, 1 of 180 billion Hispanics, and I of 340 billion African-
Americans [and the victim's] genetic profile would be expected to occur
in I of 110 trillion Hispanics, 1 of 140 trillion Caucasians, and I of 610
trillion African-Americans.
46
The court deemed these numbers admissible, writing that "[w]hen the
perpetrator's race is unknown, the frequencies with which the matched
profile occurs in various racial groups to which the perpetrator might belong
are relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the rarity of the profile. 47
3. Prince
Although the Fifth District's preliminary-fact rule had not spread, it
remained potent in its lair. The Fifth District applied it again in People v.
Prince.48 Patrick Paul Prince was charged with burglary, assault, and sexual
crimes against five victims. 49 In two of the attacks, "DNA matching his was
found on a mask that each girl identified as having been worn by her
attacker." 50 Comparable evidence was not available in the other crimes, but
the prosecution maintained that the modus operandi was so distinctive that
all had to have been committed by the same individual. 51 A criminalist
found DNA on the mask and discovered that it matched Prince's at nine
STR loci.52 She testified about "a likelihood ratio that compared two
different alternative possibilities, i.e., either the individual contributing the
known reference sample contributed the evidence DNA and that is why the
profiles matched; or the evidence DNA was contributed by some unknown,
unrelated individual who happened to have the same DNA profile." 53 Using
data from the FBI on three samples of about 200 Caucasians, 200
Hispanics, and 200 African-Americans, she concluded that "for the
Caucasian population, the evidence DNA profile was approximately 1.9
trillion times more likely to match appellant's DNA profile if he was the
contributor of that DNA rather than some unknown, unrelated individual;
for the Hispanic population, it was 2.6 trillion times more likely; and for the
46. Id. at 106.
47. 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 110.
48. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300 (Ct. App. 2005), rev granted, 132 P.3d 210 (Cal. 2006), rev. denied,
142 P.3d 1184 (Cal. 2006) (in light of the court's decision in People v. Wilson, 136 P.3d 864 (Cal.
2006)).
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 303.
51. Id. at 303-04.
52. Id. at 309.
53. Id.
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African-American population[,] it was about 9.1 trillion times more
likely. '54
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. 5 Prince appealed,
primarily on the ground that "this statistical evidence was irrelevant because
the prosecution failed to present substantial evidence to prove that the
perpetrator was Caucasian, Hispanic, or African-American., 56  The
California Court of Appeal applied Pizarro, insisting that independent
evidence had to establish the racial or ethnic identity of the perpetrator for
any statistics on the frequency of a DNA genotype in that racial or ethnic
group to be relevant.57 However, it added an escape mechanism. It reasoned
that because there was substantial non-DNA evidence linking Prince, a
Caucasian, to the two crimes, the statistic for Caucasians was relevant after
all.58 The court regarded the admission of the statistics for Hispanics and
African-Americans as erroneous, but harmless. 59 Despite the perceived
errors at trial, the court of appeal thus affirmed the convictions.
60
4. Beyond Pizarro and Prince
The relevance analysis in Prince and Pizarro is logically defective. It is
wrong to say, as the Prince court does, that "[t]he probative value (hence,
the relevancy) of a [DNA] profile's frequency in an ethnic population
depends on proof that the perpetrator belongs to that ethnic group. 61 Part
III of this Article explains why. It applies a likelihood-based theory of
relevance to show that the statistics for various "races" or ethnic groups
ordinarily are relevant without regard to the defendant's race or ethnicity.
Part III then shows that even if it were true that frequencies in major
subpopulations were only conditionally relevant, this condition normally
could not be satisfied by other evidence that the defendant is guilty. Instead,
evidence that makes it more probable that some other member of his racial
or ethnic group (as opposed to any other such group) is the culprit would be
necessary. Evidence that only singles out the defendant but otherwise
54 Prince, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 310.
55. Id. at 303.
56. Id. at 310.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 325-26.
59. See id.
60. More precisely, it affirmed the convictions on ten counts and reversed the convictions on
another two counts. Prince, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 327. The published portions of the opinion do not
explain the basis for the partial reversal.
61. /d.at304.
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provides no information about the race or ethnicity of the perpetrator does
not fill in the putative logical lacuna. Hence, the court's thought that the
other evidence against Prince made the likelihood ratio of 1.9 trillion
relevant is at war with its own exclusionary rule.
In a sense, the problem is academic. As of late 2006, the California
Supreme Court sided with the First District, and it chose People v. Wilson
6 2
as the vehicle for reviewing the relevance analysis of Prince and Pizarro. In
Wilson, the Supreme Court recognized the logical difficulties with the
63dictum in Pizarro. It also granted review in People v. Prince, but then
dismissed this grant of review "[i]n light of our decision in People v. Wilson
.... ,64 Thus, Pizarro and Prince are no longer good precedent in
California.
But why, precisely, was the Supreme Court correct in rejecting Pizarro
and Prince? The analysis that follows reveals the power of some simple
statistical concepts to clarify issues of relevance. The exposition is valuable
not only because one never knows whether the Fifth District's relevance
rule might appeal to some other courts across the country, but also because
any analytical tool that might sharpen the thinking of lawyers and courts is
well worth considering.
III. WHY DNA STATISTICS ARE RELEVANT
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence . . . having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action., 65 Consequently, to the extent that a DNA
match tends to prove that the biological trace evidence that apparently
originated from the perpetrator of the crime contained the defendant's cells,
it is relevant. A DNA match has this tendency when the probability of
observing all the matching trace evidence is greater if the defendant is the
source than if someone else is. 6 6 If E stands for the observations of the DNA
profiles, and if D represents the hypothesis that the defendant (D) is the
62. 136 P.3d 864.
63. 132 P.3d 210 (Cal. 2006).
64. 142 P.3d 1184 (Cal. 2006).
65. CAL. EVID. CODE § 210 (West 1995 & Supp. 2008); cf. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.").
66. See D. H. Kaye, The Relevance of "Matching" DNA: Is the Window Half Open or Half
Shut?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 676, 683-84 (1995); Richard Lempert, Some Caveats
Concerning DNA as Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13
CARDOZO L. REv. 303, 320 (1991).
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source, while I represents the hypothesis another unrelated individual is the
source, then the evidence E is relevant to prove D if and only if the
conditional probability of the evidence E on the hypothesis D (that is,
P(EID)) is greater than the corresponding probability on the alternative
hypothesis (that is, P(E 1/)). 67 In other words, E is relevant (and tends to
prove D) if and only if the ratio of these two quantities (the likelihood ratio




But how is a court to know whether a likelihood ratio exceeds 1? This
is where the racial frequencies come in. If the evidence is very likely to
arise when D is the source and very unlikely when someone else is, then the
numerator in (1) is much greater than the denominator, and the likelihood
ratio is much greater than 1. E is then not only relevant but also highly
probative.69 Putting to the side such complications as the possibility of
cross-contamination that would produce a false-positive match, as I do
throughout this article, if the matching DNA profile is very rare among
individuals other than D, then the denominator is small, and condition (1)
holds.
This analysis reveals when and why a DNA match is relevant, but it
does not yet explain why any statistics are also relevant. They are not
relevant as explicitly defined in Rule 210, but they are relevant nonetheless
as an aid to the understanding of evidence that meets the Rule's definition.70
DNA statistics possess this "explanatory" or "secondary" relevance because
they enable the jury to appreciate the probative value of the primary
evidence, the DNA match. That is, like a chart or map that is admitted to
help the jury understand a witness's testimony about a material fact, these
67. See Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (1977).
68. Id. at 1025-26.
69. Arguments for using likelihood ratios to measure probative value are presented in D. H.
Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Misquantification of Probative Value, 27 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
645 (2003). The likelihood ratio is commonly employed as a component of a Bayesian analysis.
See, e.g., Peter Donnelly & Richard D. Friedman, DNA Database Searches and the Legal
Consumption of Scientific Evidence, 97 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1999). However, one can maintain
that the likelihood ratio expresses the strength of evidence without endorsing or subscribing to
Bayesian methods for statistical inference. See, e.g., RICHARD M. ROYALL, STATISTICAL
EVIDENCE: A LIKELIHOOD PARADIGM 172-73 (DR. Cox et al. eds., 1997).
70. For the text of CAL. EVID. CODE § 210, see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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numbers are admissible because they help the jury comprehend the meaning
of the primary fact that two samples of DNA match.
To establish that the usual DNA statistics tend to show how probative
the DNA match is, it may be helpful to consider a hypothetical case in
which the relevant population is unusually clear. The circumstances are
such that exactly one thousand unrelated men - and no one else - could
have left the incriminating DNA sample. This group is the relevant
population. Let us assume that 1/2 of the men are Caucasian, 1/8 are
Hispanic, 1/8 are African-American, and the remaining 1/4 have other
ancestries. One of these men, designated D, is tested. Lo and behold, the
DNA matches. We may denote this event as MD. No one else is tested, but
D is charged with the crime.
What must the jury know to assess the strength of this evidence, as
expressed by the likelihood ratio in equation (1)? First, it needs the
numerator, the chance of the match if D is indeed the source. 71 For an error-
free test, this is P(EID) = P(MDID) = 1.72 The denominator is trickier. It is
the probability that D would match if someone else were the source of the
DNA.73 Assuming that D was not selected for testing based on his genotype
(or anything correlated to it), he can be regarded as a random draw from the
relevant population.74 Alas, we do not know the actual frequency of alleles
or profiles in this group of one thousand. After all, if we knew all the
profiles, we would not need any statistics. If the incriminating profile were
found only once in the relevant population, the one individual with that
profile would have to be the source. If more than one of the thousand men
had the profile, then the DNA evidence would incriminate each of them
equally -just as DNA evidence alone incriminates two monozygotic twins
to the same degree.75
Nevertheless, as far as DNA types go, it may be reasonable to regard
the relevant population of one thousand as a random sample of the general
male population. The chance that a randomly selected member of a random
sample has a given trait is just the frequency of the trait in the population.76
Therefore, on the hypothesis of innocence, the probability that D would
have the misfortune of sharing the actual assailant's DNA profile is simply
the frequency f of this profile in the general population. Hence, P(EI) =f
71. See Lempert, supra note 67, at 1023-24; see also COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN
UPDATE, supra note 7, at 128.
72. See Lempert, supra note 67, at 1024.
73. See id.
74. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SC.: AN UPDATE, supra note 7, at 127.
75. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., supra note 20, at 3-4, 144.
76. COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, supra note 7, at 127.
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and we conclude that the likelihood ratio is:
P(E D) _ 1 (2)
P(E I) f
Consequently, the probative value of the match turns on f the profile
frequency in the general male population. This statistic would be relevant
not for its own sake, but because it helps explain the meaning of E. But
which general male population is involved? The entire country? A city? A
state? DNA analysts are able to finesse such questions because DNA allele
frequencies, classified by race, show largely the same distributions in
collections of DNA samples from many sources including blood banks,
paternity-testing laboratories, and convicted offenders. 7 With the allele
frequencies in such samples, the "unmodified product rule" leads to a list of
race-specific frequencies or likelihoods such as those in Prince.78 Their
logical relevance comes from their ability to indicate the magnitude off
The legal theory is that the jury can make better use of the evidence of a
DNA match if it knows how rare the profiles are in several major
population groups (or even one such group) than if it has no frequency
information and must resort to uninformed guessing. 79 The objection that
the figures include races other than the perpetrator's misses the explanatory
purpose for which the statistics are introduced.80 The very fact that the
frequencies are tiny in one race after another assists the jury in deciding
what evidentiary value to attach to the finding of a match. Thus, the usual
statistics possess explanatory relevance.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH RACE AS A "PRELIMINARY FACT"
The explication of explanatory relevance in Part III might seem like a
tortuous way to reach the intuitively obvious conclusion that the frequency
in the entire population of plausible suspects is relevant. If so, I can only
say that the California courts could not agree on this fundamental point. The
Prince court of appeal wrote that:
[A]ny [frequencies] that do not [come from] the perpetrator's racial group
are irrelevant, of themselves, to establish that the defendant is likely the
77. See id. at 58.
78. See Venegas, 954 P.2d at 542.
79. See COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, supra note 7, at 166-67.
80. See id. at 187-88.
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perpetrator .... The selection of three individual ethnic databases, even
assuming they represent the three largest population groups, is insufficient
for this purpose because they have no value independent of the ethnicity of
the perpetrator. All such evidence tells the jury is that the DNA profile is
statistically rare in those population groups. It neither excludes nor
includes the perpetrator as a member of any of those groups, nor does it
specifically identify the defendant as being in the same population group
as the perpetrator.
8'
This is not a claim that the frequency evidence is relevant but
inadmissible because it will confuse the jury. It is not a claim that the
population genetics model underlying the estimate is speculative or not
generally accepted. It is not a claim that categories like "Caucasian,"
"Hispanic," and "African American" are socially constructed and devoid of
essential meaning. It is not a claim that the frequencies fail to account for
the probability of laboratory or handling error. The court did not bar the
introduction of the racial and ethnic frequencies on any of these possible
grounds. Rather, it asserted that the frequencies are logically irrelevant
unless another fact first is established on the basis of other evidence: "The
probative value (hence, the relevancy) of a profile's frequency in an ethnic
population depends on proof that the perpetrator belongs to that ethnic
group."
8 2
Part III revealed why profile frequencies are relevant without regard to
any proof of a perpetrator's race. This section shows that odd consequences
follow from efforts to apply the Pizarro rule of conditional relevance. The
rule could allow the foundational fact to be established in two ways. There
might be evidence unrelated to the defendant that proves the perpetrator's
race; or, the defendant himself might provide the link in that other evidence
of his guilt would imply that it was someone (namely, the defendant) of his
race who committed the crime. Each type of proof of the preliminary fact is
awkward at best.
A. Foundation Evidence Unrelated to the Defendant
In a substantial number of cases, some evidence of the perpetrator's
ethnicity will be available. If an eyewitness has seen a somewhat dark-
skinned individual, the court's reasoning should permit the African-
American and Hispanic frequencies to be admitted (but not, one might
81. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313-14.
82. Id. at 304; see also id. at 308 ("[T]he perpetrator's ethnicity should have been established
independently.").
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argue, the Caucasian frequency). However, racial identifications are fallible,
and there is a broad range of skin coloration within all the racial groups.
Therefore, even with an eyewitness to the crime, "[i]t is not always easy to
say when the race of the perpetrator is 'known."' 83 Moreover, even when
the evidence is powerful, a defendant should be permitted to argue that a
person of another race is responsible.84 When the prosecution and the
defense have competing racial hypotheses, the frequency of the DNA
profile in both groups is informative. The Supreme Court in Wilson made
this point forcefully:
Excluding probability evidence about any but the most likely group could
deprive the jury of potentially crucial evidence. If, for example, the jury
believed it 51 percent likely the perpetrator was Caucasian, providing it
with the probability only for Caucasians would leave it uninformed
regarding the 49 percent possibility the perpetrator was of some other
population group.85
Even the Prince court itself ultimately seems to reject its own demand
for independent proof of the perpetrator's ethnicity. 86 It expands "the
perpetrator's population" to encompass "the general population" when it
writes that "it is not enough to show that the genetic profile is rare in a
certain number of ethnic populations., 87 Instead, it must be shown either
that the genetic profile is rare in the perpetrator's racial group or in the
general population, as these are the perpetrator's populations. 88
If the court is serious about allowing proof of the frequency "in the
general population,, 8 9 then it would seem that the fact that "the genetic
profile is rare" in a range of ethnic populations shows that it is rare in the
general population. The court, nonetheless, suggests that something is
lacking-"a showing that [the frequencies] represent not just major
population groups but the general population as a whole." 90 Unfortunately,
the opinion does not reveal what might constitute the requisite showing,
83. Wilson, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 110, aff'd, 136 P.3d 864 (Cal. 2006). The Court of Appeal
added that "[f]or instance, in People v. Soto .... a rape victim described her attacker as a white
man with light hair. Soto, a neighbor of the victim who was ultimately convicted based at least
partly on DNA evidence, was Hispanic with a dark complexion and black hair." Id.
84. Wilson, 136 P.3d at 870 ("If a defendant wanted to argue that the perpetrator might have
been a member of a particular population group for which the odds were more favorable to the
defense, surely it would be relevant and permissible to admit evidence of those odds.").
85. Id.
86. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 313.
87. Prince, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306 n.17, 322.
88. Id. at313.
89. Id. at 324.
90. Id. at 323.
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although it alludes to the possibility of expert testimony. 9' Presumably, an
expert might opine that inasmuch as the general population is composed of
major population groups, the figures for these latter groups determine the
figure for the population as a whole. But this is an algebraic truth rather
than a substantive insight. If each major population group represents a
proportion pj of the total population, with a profile frequency j, in each
group, then the frequency f in the population is the sum these frequencies
weighted by how often they occur: f= 1pfi. Because each pj is between 0
and 1, this weighted average must lie between the largest and the smallest.
Inasmuch as courts can take judicial notice of mathematical theorems,
92
expert testimony is not even necessary when the "major population groups"
exhaust the population.
In Prince, however, the criminalist did not give frequencies for every
general racial population.93 Only Caucasian, Hispanic, and African-
American frequencies were presented.94 Even so, if these estimates-each
in the trillionths-are credible, then the frequencies in the omitted groups
would have to be enormously higher for the incriminating genotype to be
anything other than "rare... in the general population. 95 Consequently, the
three numbers surely had some tendency to prove that the DNA match was
unlikely to be the result of coincidence. Indeed, census data indicate that
they arguably covered 94% of the population of Kern County, where the
crimes occurred.96 Even if the profile frequency among the people not
included in the three main groups were a thousand times larger than the
largest frequency in those groups, the frequency for the general country
population would be only about 3 in 100 million.97
91. Id. at 312.
92. The doctrine ofjudicial notice permits a court to find an indisputable fact without hearing
any testimony or other evidence and to instruct a jury in a criminal case that it may do likewise.
For example, courts have taken judicial notice of historical facts, such as the dates on which wars
began and ended, and of geographical facts, such as the boundaries of states, counties, and
townships. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 378 (John Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
93. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 322.
94. Id. at 309.
95. Id. at 317.
96. The opinion does not specify the locations of the residences of the five victims, but the
DNA samples from the two victims were analyzed at the Kern County laboratory, and the trial
was held in Kern County. Prince, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 309. Table I indicates that expanding the
boundaries beyond Kern County would not alter materially the racial and ethnic population
proportions. See infra Appendix, tbl. I at p. 322.
97. Using the percentages for Kern County in Table 1, Table 2 shows the profile frequency
for a range of values of the frequency in the 6% of the population not covered by the criminalist's
statistics. See infra Appendix, tbl.2, at p. 322.
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B. Other Evidence of Defendant's Guilt as Foundation Evidence
Can the prosecution pull itself up by the defendant's bootstraps to
create the foundation to admit DNA statistics for defendant's race? The
argument might go like this: "Your Honor, we have ample evidence of the
perpetrator's race. The race is the same as the defendant's. We know this
because of the following non-DNA evidence that points to defendant: .... .
Although this might seem like a cheap trick, the court in Prince itself used
precisely this reasoning.98 It maintained that the preliminary fact of the
perpetrator's race was proved by evidence that linked the defendant and no
one else in particular to the rapes:
In the present case, there was no direct evidence of the perpetrator's
ethnicity. However, direct evidence, such as a description from a
percipient witness, is not the only means of establishing the preliminary
fact. Instead, the requisite fact can also be established through other
independent evidence (evidence not dependent upon the profile match,
match frequency, or the defendant's ethnicity per se) that the defendant is
the perpetrator. The logic is as follows: If independent evidence establishes
that the defendant more likely than not is the perpetrator, and the defendant
is Caucasian, then independent evidence establishes ... that the perpetrator
more likely than not is Caucasian. The preliminary fact of the perpetrator's
ethnicity is thus sufficiently established so that match frequency statistics,
computed from a Caucasian database, are relevant to prove the defendant's
identity as the perpetrator.
99
The "independent evidence" that the court deemed sufficient to
establish the preliminary fact of the perpetrator's race was:
[T]he actual evidence.., that defendant is the perpetrator .... [E]vidence
presented by means of victim testimony showed that the perpetrator wore a
ski mask and used a flashlight with a colored lens. Appellant possessed
such items; therefore, the evidence establishes that appellant could be the
perpetrator.00
And so, the court concluded that:
98. 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325.
99. Id. (referring to the standard in CAL. EVID. CODE § 403 (West 2008) that determines
when there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of preliminary fact).
100. Id. at 326.
[E]vidence [set out] at length in the unpublished portion of our opinion .... Suffice it to
say that items seized from appellant's residence and car, as well as appellant's reaction
when asked to give a buccal swab, are pertinent to our analysis. Although none is
sufficient standing alone, when considered cumulatively, they meet the ... standard.
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Since the record sufficiently establishes that appellant is the perpetrator
and therefore shares the perpetrator's race, and appellant is Caucasian, the
profile frequency statistics derived from the Caucasian database, as
testified to by [the criminalist], were relevant. The evidence with respect to
the other ethnic databases was not; however, its admission did not
prejudice appellant. 101
This reasoning could be applied in virtually every case in which some
evidence beyond the DNA match incriminates the defendant. 10 2 Such
"independent evidence" need not be extensive. 10 3 It need only "be sufficient
evidence to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that it is more probable
that the fact exists than that it does not." 104 The fact that the court that
originated the preliminary-evidence rule embraced a defendant-based
method to satisfy it speaks volumes. Because the rule lacks a meaningful
justification, it is difficult to apply sensibly. In contrast, the rule that well
grounded statistics from a variety of racial groups are admissible to convey
the probative value of a DNA match in a general-population case makes
good sense. But it is not the only way to indicate to the jurors the probative
value of the fact of the DNA match. The remaining section enumerates
some "race-blind" methods.
V. RACE-BLIND STATISTICS?
The Prince court seemed drawn to dispensing with statistics for races
entirely. It wrote that:
[W]hen the perpetrator's ethnicity is unknown, the most appropriate
solutions would appear to be (1) to present the one most conservative
frequency, without mention of ethnicity, or (2) assuming this method is
scientifically valid and results in a frequency that is considered
conservative, to present a single frequency calculation based on a general,
nonethnic population database. When frequency calculations that do not
reference ethnicity are employed, the profile frequency evidence no longer
tells jurors that if the defendant and the perpetrator share ethnicity, the
likelihood the defendant is the perpetrator is some number. Instead, the
evidence tells jurors that regardless of the perpetrator's ethnicity, the
likelihood the defendant is the perpetrator is some number. Jurors then
have to decide whether, in their minds, the genetic profile is sufficiently
101 Id. (citing People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956)).
102. See id. at 325-26.
103. Id.
104. Prince, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 325.
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rare so as to be persuasive as to identification of the defendant as the
perpetrator. 
105
Although we have seen that these approaches are not required by the
law of evidence, there is a certain appeal in simply describing the
significance of the DNA match in terms of a statistic that does not refer to
any particular races. A few comments on the court's proposal, and of other
possibilities, therefore are in order.
The court's first approach is a less extreme version of the "modified
ceiling principle"'' 0 6 for computing profile frequencies (with less of a
guarantee of producing a ceiling). Of course, a single number suppresses
the information on variability that comes from hearing how much the
profile frequencies differ for three or four races. On the other hand, it is
doubtful that the jury will find the variations of much importance, at least
when the set of frequencies are in the millionths or beyond. Consequently,
this proposal is not unreasonable.
The second approach, involving a racially blended database, is also
possible. In effect, one would pool the reference databases for the various
races, then use the allele frequencies in the pooled database to obtain a
profile frequency estimate. However, the population supposedly represented
by the pooled reference database is not randomly mating. 107 An adjustment
for population structure would be needed. The procedure is more
complicated than the unmodified product rule, but it is technically
feasible.'0 8
Finally, the expert could compute the probability that the defendant
would match given that the true source is a close genetic relative. Even
when the suspect population is composed entirely of unrelated individuals,
this number can provide an upper bound on the frequency in that
population. Thus, one group of scientists recommended using such a
computation for a sibling when "there is uncertainty about the population
105. Id. at 313-14 (citation omitted). Of course, no population frequency can express "the
likelihood the defendant is the perpetrator." See, e.g., People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33, 39-41 (Cal.
1968).
106. See supra Part ILA; see also COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, supra note 7
(concluding that the ceiling principle is not needed); Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle,
Commentary: DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735 (1994) (defending the
ceiling principle).
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, THE FUTURE OF
FORENSIC DNA TESTING: PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING
GROUP 5 (2000) ("[T]he necessity for group classification could be avoided by using an overall
U.S. database and an appropriately increased value of [the population-structure parameter] 0....
A 0 value of 0.03 would usually be appropriate."), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/183697.pdf.
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substructure, as with isolated tribes or communities, or possible
unsuspected relatives."10 9 The formulas for this "Sib Method" are well
known:
The conditional match probability for a pair of sibs is determined mainly
by simple Mendelian rules and is relatively unaffected by allele
frequencies (which may differ among population subgroups) and
unsuspected substructure, inbreeding, or presence of relatives. Since no
other relatives are as close as sibs, the match probability for sibs provides a
rough upper limit for the actual match probability. 110
One could go a step further and use this conservative approach in every
case in which the DNA samples are of adequate size and quality for testing
at a large number of loci. Because this likelihood is virtually certain to
exceed the match probability in any population of unrelated individuals, it
could be presented as an. estimate of the frequency in either a general-
population or a subpopulation case.
In short, it appears that there are scientifically defensible ways to avoid
referring to racial population frequencies or probabilities and to convey a
sense of the likelihood ratio in a general-population case. The California
and the Federal Rules of Evidence should allow them to be used. But
neither evidence code dictates that they must be used in lieu of the
established procedure of estimating profile frequencies or probabilities in
all of the applicable major races. In recognizing as much, People v. Wilson
represents a welcome return to normal evidence doctrine.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.; see also Thomas R. Belin et al., Summarizing DNA Evidence When Relatives Are
Possible Suspects, 92 J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 706, 707 (1997).
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Appendix
Table 1. Population Percentages (2000).1
Kern County California U.S.A.
White 49.5 46.7 69.1
Hispanic 38.4 32.4 12.5
Black 6.0 6.7 12.3
Total 93.9 85.8 93.9
Table 2. Kern County 9-locus Genotype Frequency
for Possible Frequencies in the Groups
Not Included in the Criminalist's Statistics
Percent of Genotype Product Total
County p Frequencyf pf] y_,pj f
1. White 49.5 5.26 x10-1°  2.61 x 10-10
2. Hispanic 38.4 3.85 x 10l °  1.48 x 10-10
3. Black 6.0 1.10 X 1010 6.59 x 10-l
4. Other 6.1 fi = 5.26 xl0l°  3.21 x 10-". 4.47 x 10
10f, 3.21 x 10-10  7.36 x 1010
100f, 3.21 x 10-9  3.63 x 10-9
1000f, 3.21 x 10"8 3.25 x 108
111. U.S. Census Bureau, State and County Quick Facts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/
states/06000.html & http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06029.html.
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